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In 1980, 17-year-old Santae Tribble was on trial for the murder of 
a 63-year-old man who was robbed and shot on the front porch 
of his Washington, D.C., home. There was little evidence in the 
case, aside from the testimony of a police informant, who said 
Tribble had admitted to his involvement. Tribble had a strong 
alibi too, with a number of witnesses all testifying that he was 
away at his mother’s in Maryland at the time of the murder. The 
federal prosecutors, however, had one more piece of evidence. At 
Tribble’s trial, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analyst 
presented a microscopic examination of hairs from the stocking 
mask the killer had worn and discarded near the crime scene.
The FBI analyst explained that “[o]nly on very rare occasions” 
had he ever seen hairs of two individuals with the same charac-
teristic. More pointed, he found the hairs with those of Tribble 
and concluded that “I found that these hairs . . . matched in all 
microscopic characteristics with the head hair samples submit-
ted to me from Santae Tribble.” In his closing arguments, the 
prosecutor went further: “There is one chance, perhaps for all we 
know, in 10 million that it could [be] someone else’s hair.” Tribble 
was sentenced to 20 years to life, and served a 23-year sentence.
In fact, none of the 13 hairs belonged to Tribble. Nine years 
after Tribble’s parole in 2003, DNA tests exonerated him. The 
hairs were not his, but came from three other individuals—and 
a dog. The “science” behind the FBI’s testimony was so weak, 
it couldn’t even distinguish human hair from animal hair. The 
FBI response to this case and the cases of two other men would 
eventually lead to one of the largest crime lab audits in history.
Systemic Problems
The problem of unsound forensic evidence is not limited to hair 
analysis. In 2009, a National Academy of Sciences committee 
tasked by Congress with studying the needs of the forensic sci-
ence community found not only was there “no scientific support” 
for the use of hair evidence to identify defendants, but also that 
the problem is much broader. No forensic discipline, apart from 
DNA testing, “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”
Despite the fact that most forensic evidence is far from con-
clusive, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals have been 
convicted and deprived of their liberty based on assertions by 
government agents that the evidence is reliable science. I have 
read trial transcripts of DNA exonerees by the hundreds, and 
they are chilling. I have found that more often than not, the tes-
timony was exaggerated, overstated, and erroneous. My book, 
Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, 
told the story of the first 250 DNA exonerations in the United 
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In Bad Hair: The Legal Response to Mass Forensic Errors, 
Professor Brandon Garrett begins by describing the infamous 
Santae Tribble case. Fortunately, we have learned a lot since his 
conviction in 1980, and not just in microscopic hair analysis. It is 
clear that many forensic witnesses in years past overstated their 
conclusions and that prosecutors also overstated the experts’ 
conclusions in their jury arguments. But one caveat is that, in 
many instances, that was the “science” as it was known at the 
time. We have learned much since the advent of DNA analysis 
about where the system went wrong. In most cases, it is unfair 
to overgeneralize past forensic science testimony as widespread 
fraudulent forensic science.
Of course, while some conclusions were overstated, not ev-
ery defendant was factually innocent. Often other evidence 
pointed toward guilt. That said, even the overstated conclusions 
likely would warrant a new trial or, at a minimum, an eviden-
tiary hearing. There is no excuse for withholding evidence or 
laboratory procedures, especially if the undisclosed evidence 
or procedure might lead to the exclusion or exoneration of a 
suspect. Transparency and disclosure of any and all relevant 
information to the defense and the courts is essential. While 
Professor Garrett is critical of government agents, including fo-
rensic scientists, it also should be noted that defense attorneys, 
trial judges, and appellate courts at the time often didn’t chal-
lenge or critically review forensic evidence and the conclusions 
flowing from it. 
Errors and omissions of the type that occurred in the Tribble 
case often still happen today. But one very positive step to correct 
that has been the increasing effort to provide forensic science 
education for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in the 
States. Based on updated data and a detailed review of the cases, 
we learn that more than half of the exonerations involved convic-
tions based on invalid, erroneous, or concealed forensics. Most 
egregiously, 28 cases involved concealed exculpatory forensics 
that could have supported a claim of innocence at trial if it had 
been disclosed. An additional 29 cases involved analysis that 
was erroneous, including lab errors.
These systemic problems have increasingly confronted law-
yers, judges, and policymakers with the question: What should 
be done when an entire forensic crime laboratory breaks down? 
Forensic science evidence—from DNA to fingerprints, ballis-
tics, pathology, and chemical assays—is used in hundreds of 
thousands of criminal investigations each year. There are over 
400 public crime labs in the United States, as well as private 
labs. Without forensics, serious crimes would go unsolved. With 
modern forensics, innocent people have had their names cleared. 
And yet, with alarming frequency, groups of forensic analysts or 
even entire crime labs have had their work come under scrutiny 
due to flawed or even fraudulent work. The response has some-
times been that this was due to the work of a “bad apple,” and 
sometimes people did commit terrible mistakes or they falsi-
fied evidence. But the reason so many entire crime labs around 
the country have been audited or even shut down is that sound 
systems were not in place to prevent forensic errors and even 
fraud. Despite lessons learned from countless wrongful convic-
tions and lab scandals, those systems still require an overhaul.
The systemic nature of the problem can be appreciated by 
considering the facts about how this work is done and how law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and crime labs close ranks when 
problems emerge. Forensic analysts used by prosecutors typi-
cally work in groups at law enforcement crime labs or within 
police departments with common supervision and training. For 
instance, from 1985, when the FBI began tracking cases using a 
computer system, to 1999, FBI agents analyzed and testified in 
over 3,000 cases using hair comparisons. The FBI also “trained” 
untold numbers of state and local hair analysts for 25 years.
And yet, despite the high stakes and reason to believe the 
problem is widespread, government officials have generally re-
sisted large-scale audits of forensic evidence used in criminal 
trials. Take the case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard, exonerated by 
DNA testing after serving 15 years in prison in Montana. At his 
trial, the then director of the Montana State Crime Laboratory 
compared more than 30 hairs and found that they all “matched” 
Bromgard’s hairs. He announced his conclusion in court with 
seemingly powerful but made-up statistics that had no scientific 
basis. He did the same in other cases. Two more men, Chester 
Bauer and Paul Kordonowy, were wrongly convicted based on 
his testimony, only to be exonerated by DNA after years spent in 
prison. To this day, there has been no examination of the other 
cases that lab director worked on or supervised in the lab. When (Continued on page 35)
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Bromgard’s lawyers requested an audit, the Montana Supreme 
Court refused to order one. The Montana attorney general also 
refused to investigate the lab, saying it would be an “expensive, 
tedious process.”
Problems with this kind of testimony had been known for 
years, but FBI agents continued to testify in court with an air 
of certainty about the science of hair analysis. In the mid-1990s, 
the inspector general created a task force that reviewed FBI 
hair comparison work “after reports that sloppy work by ex-
aminers at the FBI lab was producing unreliable forensic evi-
dence in court trials.” Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left 
Uninformed of Forensic Flaws Found by Justice Dept., Wash. Post, 
Apr. 16, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicted- 
defendants-left-uninformed-of-forensic-flaws-found-by-justice-
dept/2012/04/16/gIQAWTcgMT_story.html. The findings were 
never released. Only the prosecutors in affected cases were noti-
fied—not the defense or the people convicted based on the flawed 
testimony, like Santae Tribble, who was still in prison at the time. 
The cases even included death penalty cases. The inspector gen-
eral who conducted the investigation, Michael Bromwich, was 
deeply troubled that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI 
task force “apparently failed to follow through and ensure that 
defense counsel were notified in every single case.”
It is important to note this was not the first time the FBI’s 
crime lab had to reckon with claims of junk science. The 
FBI stopped using “bullet-lead” comparisons in response to 
devastating criticism from the scientific community. Similarly, 
the FBI conducted an inquiry and improved procedures in re-
sponse to a high-profile error in a fingerprint case, in which 
agents falsely implicated an Oregon lawyer as a terrorist asso-
ciated with the Madrid train bombings in 2004.
Problems Finally Come to Light
The lid began to come off due to the tireless work of lawyers at 
the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. They 
helped free a man named Donald Eugene Gates, who was con-
victed of murder in Washington, D.C., and spent 28 years in pris-
on. He had been convicted based in part on erroneous hair com-
parison testimony by an FBI agent. In 2009, he was exonerated 
by DNA tests that proved his innocence. Gates was not the only 
one. Lawyers at the D.C. Public Defender Service also helped free 
Kirk Odom, who served 22 years in prison, and Santae Tribble. 
In both cases, FBI agents testified that hair analysis linked the 
men to the crimes. They were wrong.
Initially, the response of the U.S. Attorney and the FBI was 
to treat this as an isolated bad-apple problem. After the Gates 
exoneration, when the judge was considering an inquiry into 
additional cases, the U.S. Attorney’s Office told the court that 
there was “no legal and scientific basis for conducting such a 
‘massive’ audit.” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Chief 
Judge Lee F. Satterfield, (Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
Illustration by Enrico Varrasso
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Fortunately, the lawyers at the Public Defender Service did not 
give up. After the two additional DNA exonerations, which the 
Washington Post described in 2012, the U.S. Attorney and the 
FBI agreed to try to review not just the work of the examiners in 
those particular cases but also the work of all convictions based 
on hair analysis. If errors were identified, the DOJ notified the 
defense attorney at trial, the defendant, and the prosecutor. The 
government also agreed to provide free DNA testing and waive 
any procedural barriers to re-litigating these cases in post-con-
viction proceedings. These steps set an important template for 
future administrative schemes for the review of forensic errors, 
whether ordered by a court or an executive agency.
In March 2015, after the FBI analyzed 500 cases, it announced 
that “at least 90 percent” of trial transcripts contained erroneous 
statements. The FBI noted that defendants in at least 35 of the 
cases had received the death penalty, and errors were identified 
in 33 of those cases. Nine had already been executed and five 
died of other causes on death row. The FBI also announced that 
26 of 28 agents either gave testimony or submitted lab reports 
with erroneous statements.
In response to the FBI and DOJ audit, Massachusetts, New 
York, North Carolina, and Texas are beginning to review cases 
that involved hair analysis. Many more states need to do the 
same. In Texas, the Forensic Science Commission is also review-
ing old cases involving bite mark testimony and statistics used 
in thousands of old DNA cases. In Massachusetts, courts have 
ordered a sustained inquiry into the casework of a crime lab 
chemist who falsified results and engaged in “dry labbing,” or 
failure to even do the tests. That analyst worked on an estimated 
40,000 cases. An internal report noted that the high number of 
the chemist’s cases alone was troublesome. In response to “egre-
gious misconduct” and “a lapse of widespread magnitude in the 
criminal justice system,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court has set up procedures to notify defendants and conduct 
hearings in those cases. The chief justice of the Superior Court 
ordered judges to hold special “drug lab sessions”—hundreds of 
hearings examining cases potentially affected by the misconduct.
Fortunately, the FBI has also expanded its review beyond cas-
es in which trial testimony was given to cases in which there was 
a guilty plea. Procedures like those adopted in Massachusetts 
may need to be used by judges to reopen any potentially af-
fected cases.
Not only can lawyers do important work in individual cases 
by challenging unscientific forensics; they can take on a more 
systemic role, as the Public Defender Services did in the FBI 
audit, by asking that judges, prosecutors, and crime labs con-
sider reopening old cases. The FBI audit began with a request 
by a judge to review certain old cases, but eventually lawyers 
convinced law enforcement to pursue a far broader inquiry.
Courts and agencies that have addressed these issues have 
various forensic science disciplines, as well as explaining the 
role human factors play in forensic analysis. The Texas Forensic 
Science Commission and the Arizona Forensic Science Academy, 
among others, have provided a model for such training. Also, 
the National Commission on Forensic Science’s subcommittee 
on training and education has made great efforts to provide an 
education template for the improvement of the forensic sciences.
Laboratories and forensic scientists are now advocating for 
and developing improved, consensual standards, guidelines, 
and forensic practitioner ethics codes. To its credit, the FBI has 
conducted inquiries in the area of microscopic hair analysis, 
lead bullet analysis, latent print comparisons, and DNA mixture 
interpretation—some in conjunction with other stakeholders 
such as the Innocence Network and the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. As Professor Garrett writes, the 
FBI’s response and cooperation in the microscopic hair analysis 
reexamination project provides a road map for future collabora-
tive reviews.
The 2009 National Academy of Sciences report led to for-
mation of the National Commission on Forensic Science (by 
the Department of Justice) and the Organization of Scientific 
Area Committees (by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology), both of which seek to improve the field of forensic 
science as well as the intersection of science and law because of 
the deficiencies found in various reviews. Those reexaminations 
should not necessarily be limited to cases that went to trial; they 
should also include those resolved through plea bargains, given 
the many DNA exonerations of people who pleaded guilty. The 
form of these reviews should be based on recommendations 
from multi-stakeholder bodies like the National Commission 
on Forensic Science. Professor Garrett’s recommendations as to 
notice, bar participation, post-conviction time bar waivers, and 
model statutes or regulations are important steps in a collabora-
tion to help ensure justice is served. 
Progress to right the wrongs of the criminal justice system 
has been slow, but it is beginning to speed up, with forensic 
scientists now getting together to improve their disciplines. 
Statistical evaluation of forensic methods and technical concepts 
are being used to better understand how past errors occurred. 
Fundamental research has identified human factor strategies 
for maximizing reliability in real-life forensic investigations. 
Based on our experience, we want to strongly commend forensic 
scientists for their demonstrated commitment to improve reli-
ability in their field and thereby improve the delivery of justice. q
S U A  S P O N T E
A Judge  Com ment s
(Continued from page 33)
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had to design corrective mechanisms themselves. We need clear 
rules and uniform approaches. Agencies, courts, legislatures, 
and bar associations should draft model regulations and statutes 
reflecting procedures to be followed when patterns of forensic 
errors come to light. Routine audit procedures should be estab-
lished. What ground rules should apply?
Suggested Ground Rules
statutory triggers. First, there should be statutory mechanisms 
to order audits of tainted crime lab evidence. Most cases result 
in plea bargains, and the typical public defender does not have 
the time or resources to consider these issues in individual cases. 
Because the problem is a systemic one that affects all cases, the 
response should be an administrative one. Of course, individual 
lawyers must be aware of these concerns and use this knowledge 
when possible to defend the wrongly accused and to bring reli-
ance on deficient scientific evidence to public light.
notice. Any audit must come with due process rights to en-
sure that the lawyers and clients actually learn that the foren-
sics were botched in their cases. It is not enough to simply send 
letters to last known addresses of lawyers who handled cases 
decades before. Many will have retired. Vigorous affirmative ef-
forts should be made to locate lawyers and their clients. Effective 
process will also require notifying institutional public defenders 
and involving state and local bar associations in taking on the 
task of handling cases.
Bar participation. The FBI did something very important in 
its audit: It partnered with the bar to identify and secure ap-
propriate relief in affected cases. Lawyers with the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the 
Innocence Project, together with pro bono lawyers at Winston 
& Strawn LLP and Michael Bromwich of the Bromwich Group, 
collaborated with the FBI in its self-examination. The FBI 
sent letters not just to defense counsel, the client, and the 
prosecutor, but also to the NACDL and Innocence Project. 
This collaborative approach provides an essential template 
for future audits.
Discovery. Notice should include more than just the informa-
tion that one’s case is part of an audit. It should include mean-
ingful discovery. Once lawyers know that there was a problem 
with the forensic evidence in the case, there should be assistance 
in locating records from the trial, including transcripts that 
record what the analysts said at trial. Complete lab notes and 
bench notes that show what the analyst claimed to have done 
in the laboratory should be preserved and located. Procedures 
in place at the lab at the time should be disclosed.
Follow-on testing. Available samples should undergo DNA 
testing, as the FBI did on its hair sample evidence.
Hearings. The court or administrative body should con-
duct hearings in which the burden is on the state to show that 
a case was not affected by the pattern of tainted forensic evi-
dence. Courts have handled systemic forensic errors using such 
a burden-shifting scheme in West Virginia and more recently in 
Massachusetts. Appointing special masters or convening spe-
cial sessions in the trial courts, as in Massachusetts, may help 
to expedite judicial review.
relief. One obstacle to relief may be post-conviction bars 
to filing successive or otherwise time-barred petitions. Any 
potentially applicable procedural bars should be waived, given 
that, at the time of trial, the defense could not have known that 
the seemingly confident lab analyst was working in, or even re-
sponsible for, a tainted system. Plea bargains also raise special 
challenges. In Massachusetts, more severe charges and sen-
tences are barred when guilty pleas are reopened. This approach 
should be replicated.
The daughter of the victim of the murder for which Tribble 
was wrongly imprisoned wrote: “I lost a father many years ago to 
murder. Now I learn that the wrong man spent years in prison for 
the crime. . . . I will do anything to help to see that justice is done.”
Lawyers must take up this challenge in specific cases and in 
general. Judges need to be far more attentive to these problems 
when they arise at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction hear-
ings. Otherwise, they are likely to face audits of thousands of 
cases down the road. Clearer scientific standards for forensics will 
help, and a DOJ-established Commission on Forensic Science has 
taken on that project. Working groups supported by the National 
Institute on Standards and Technology are also looking into these 
questions. The legal profession as well as scientists will play a 
central role in years ahead to demand audits and see that they are 
conducted carefully. Model rules for reviewing flawed forensics 
and reopening affected cases, with the full involvement of the bar, 
should be in place to ensure that justice is done. q
The “science” behind 
the FBI’s testimony 
was so weak, it couldn’t 
even distinguish human 
hair from animal hair.
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